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Accounting disclosure of tax liabilities, fair trial and self-incrimination: Should the 
European Commission endorse IFRS in light of European Human Rights? 
Prof. Dr. Raymond Luja* 
 
1. Introduction 
Can the accounting disclosure of tax liabilities harm a taxpayer’s right to a fair trial?1 
This question can become very relevant in respect of the disclosure of the assessment of 
chances of success in respect of legal procedures. In this contribution I will address this 
question from a European perspective with regard to tax positions, tax litigation and tax-
related penalties in particular. 
We must consider whether and to what extent accounting disclosure obligations may lead 
to compelled self-incrimination.2 To be clear on this, it is not the provision of relevant tax 
data itself to the tax authorities that is at issue here, like profits, turnover information, 
deduction etc., as this information is necessary to determine the tax position of a tax 
payer. The focus will be on a company being obliged to disclose contingent tax liabilities 
for accounting purposes, the disclosure of which might lead to a criminal charge in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) if it would reveal a 
                                                            
*  Professor of Comparative Tax Law at Maastricht University. This contribution reflects a 
presentation given at the GREIT conference Human Rights & Taxation at the European University 
Institute in Florence on 17 September 2010. The author would like to thank the conference 
attendants for their useful comments and Ms Cristiana Bulbuc for her efforts as a research 
assistant. 
1  For the purpose of this article a ‘tax payer’ or ‘company’ may refer to both a legal entity or a non-
incorporated enterprise that may be required to disclose accounting records in accordance with 
national law, and – where applicable – to the members of the management board of such entity 
(CEO, CFO, etc.) who may be facing individual penalties because of their role as company 
officials. 
2  Hereinafter ‘self-incrimination’ will refer to situations of compelled self-incrimination and not to 
situations where a company incriminates itself voluntarily, i.e. without any improper coercion or 
any tax/accounting obligation to do so at the time. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699736
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previous tax offense.3 As for this ‘criminal charge’ it may include the initiation of 
procedures leading up to substantial administrative penalties of a punitive nature intended 
to deter reoffending, next to any sanction designated to be of a criminal nature in 
accordance with national law.4 
In this paper I will consider the following situations: 
A. Suppose that a company is involved in an ongoing tax procedure with 
respect to the year T and that a substantial penalty has been imposed on 
it.5 It filed an appeal at the domestic court. Since such procedure takes up 
a reasonable period of time, the tax authorities will have data available 
from the annual (commercial) accounting statement of year T+1.  
In this statement information on tax liabilities is to be disclosed, including 
data estimating the outcome of pending tax litigation. 
B. Suppose that a company is not yet involved in a tax or criminal procedure. 
Subsequent disclosure of tax liabilities for (commercial) accounting 
purposes at T+1 will reveal a tax offence in respect of year T. 
 
Obviously, someone who is purposely defrauding the government will be inclined to 
forge commercial accounting statements as well by not revealing tax liabilities in full. 
Although this category of tax‘payers’ deserves a fair trial as well (and hence protection 
from self-incrimination), this paper will address another category of taxpayers: 
companies that look for the boundaries of what is permissible for tax purposes with the 
intention to stick within the limits of the law. They may need to reveal a potential tax 
                                                            
3  In this article it is assumed that the country involved operates a system where the tax assessment is 
based on a separate statement for tax purposes and that it is not directly derived from profits 
disclosed for general accounting purposes. 
4  As this issue will be addressed in the preceding conference papers, the reader is referred to those 
papers as well as to ECtHR 24 February 1994, 12547/86, Bendenoun, para. 47 and the so-called 
Engel criteria as reflected in ECtHR 23 November 2006, 73053/01, Jussila, para. 29-39. 
5  Here penalties refers to fines, as these are meant to be a deterrent for re-offending, and not to mere 
compensatory, interest-like payments to the government for late payment. 
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liability because, with hindsight, their previous bona fide tax  position  seems  to  have  
crossed the line and cannot be sustained in court despite an initial estimate of success of 
30, 50 or 70%. In this particular situation the threat of a substantial penalty cannot be 
excluded. 
 
This author does admit that disclosure of potential financial liabilities arising from 
lawsuits in general and from tax litigation in particular, is necessary to come reliable 
financial reports that duly reflect a company’s financial position. Yet, accounting 
standards should accommodate and balance certain widely recognized fundamental legal 
safeguards in the pursuit of reliable accounting.  
In a European Union context, the European Commission must first endorse the standards 
set by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) before they are to be 
applied. In doing so its actions are to be guided by the EU’s Human Rights framework. 
The question thus arises whether the European Commission may be called upon to refrain 
from adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or to adopt such IFRS 
with additional safeguards attached as it must comply with the ECHR?  
In this context we must consider to what extent information already pre-existed and 
would be available to the tax authorities upon inspection. Three situations will be taken 
into account: 
 
1. A company has received a written statement by its tax lawyer with an estimate 
of the chance of successfully upholding a particular tax position. This 
statement is protected by lawyer-client confidentiality under domestic law. 
2. As in 1, but this statement is not protected by lawyer-client confidentiality 
under domestic law. 
3. A company is not in possession of a written statement as in 1, although its 
management has a best estimate in mind. Hence no physical evidence pre-
exists. 
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In this paper I will focus on situations 1 and 3 as it is presumed that existing 
documentation in situation 2 may already be seized and used in evidence in accordance 
with domestic law by local authorities. 
 
Paragraph 2 will first clarify the European Commission’s role in the accountant standard 
setting process. In paragraph 3 I will briefly discuss the proposed changes to the current 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 12 and 37 on the disclosure of legal and tax 
liabilities. In paragraph 4 I will then focus on some recent developments in the US on 
disclosure of tax positions and of outcomes of ongoing tax litigation and link them to the 
proposed replacements of IAS 12 and IAS 37.6 Paragraph 5 will address to what extent 
the ECHR may apply here, in particular focusing on the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)’ Allen decision and its Saunders judgment. Paragraph 6 will address 
some issues regarding the balancing of interest between reliability of financial statements 
and legal safeguards. Some concluding remarks will be provided for in paragraph 7. 
 
2. The European Commission’s role in accountant standard setting 
With the introduction of Regulation 1606/2002, the European Commission has a crucial 
position within the dedicated endorsement process of international accounting standards.7 
While the IASB consists of a group of independent experts, its standards are followed by 
many national accounting standard setting bodies (including those of most EU countries). 
The EU as a whole has agreed to commit to a uniform set of internationally accepted 
accounting standards in July of 2002 in order to contribute to a better functioning of its 
internal market. This was done by means of endorsing IASB standards for use within the 
EU for consolidated financial statements of companies listed at regulated markets as from 
2005.  
                                                            
6  Once a current IAS is to be fully replaced, its replacement standard will be called an IFRS, as part 
of a renaming process. Its number may change accordingly. In case of minor changes or 
amendements, the designation ‘IAS’ will be maintained. 
7  Official Journal of the European Communities, L 243/1 of 11 September 2002. 
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With one partial exception, all IASB standards have been endorsed in full by the 
European Commission after receiving an opinion of the EU’s Accounting Regulatory 
Committee, an expert group, and after consultation of the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament. It should be pointed out that it is the Commission’s intention to 
come to full adoption of all standards without any addition to them, which is of particular 
importance in the context of the legal issues that will be discussed next. 
Upon endorsement, it being a regulatory act, the Commission is bound to observe the 
fundamental rights and general principles guaranteed by the EU. Article 47 of the revised 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union8 states as follows: “Everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law.” Furthermore, Article 48(2) states that 
“[r]espect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be 
guaranteed.” In a declaration attached to the Lisbon Treaty it was stated that this Charter 
“has legally binding force” and “confirms the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.9 
The latter also follows from Article 52 of the Charter: “rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection.” In respect of the status of this Charter, Article 6(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) provides that the rights and principles set out therein will have 
the same legal value as the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), the two core treaties of the EU.  
Article 6(3) TEU clearly reminds us that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR 
constitute general principles of EU law in their own right. In this respect Article 6(1) 
ECHR states: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
                                                            
8   Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/389 of 30 March 2010 
9   Ibid., at p. 337. 
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time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” It is this provision that 
deserve particular attention in regard to the endorsement process. 
 
3. Disclosure of legal and tax positions: IAS 12 and IAS 37 
 
Under IAS 37 the “risks and uncertainties that inevitably surround many events and 
circumstances shall be taken into account in reaching the best estimate of a provision”.10 
At present liabilities, including those arising from pending litigation, are only to be 
recognized in accounting standards if certain criteria are met. The current IAS 37 
provides that in order to recognize a financial liability, the entity needs to have (i) a 
present obligation. It must be (ii) probable that an outflow of financial resources will be 
required to fulfill that obligation, meaning that it must be more likely than not that a 
certain payment must be made. Last but not least, (iii) it must be possible to make a 
reliable estimate of that obligation.  
 
In a 2010 Exposure Draft on the Measurement of Liabilities in IAS 37, it is proposed to 
disclose liabilities at their expected value (a probability-weighed average of the expected 
outcome of, for instance, litigation) and to remove the probability test (ii), thus cancelling 
out the more-likely-than-not threshold.11 In response to a similar proposal in a 2005 
Exposure Draft the IASB received comments indicating that “defendants in legal disputes 
could risk disclosing prejudicial information if required to measure liabilities at their 
expected values. The amount recognized in the financial statements might disclose to 
adversaries the amount the defendant would be willing to pay as an out-of-court 
settlement. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions communications between a defendant and 
its lawyers could lose their lawyer-client privilege if revealed to auditors. Adversaries 
could seek discovery of opinions about the possible outcomes.”12 Be  this  as  it  may,  in  
                                                            
10  IAS 37, para. 42. 
11  Exposure Draft, Measurement of Liabilities in IAS 37, ED/2010/1 of January 2010. 
12  Ibid., para. BC13, sub d. 
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case of seriously-prejudicial information IAS 37 does allow for the non-disclosure of 
information on particular classes of disputes, which will remain unchanged.13  
 
In its July 2006 meeting the IASB considered concerns from respondents to its 2005 IAS 
37 Exposure Draft who considered that recognizing a liability that is subject to litigation 
can prejudice the entity’s position therein. The IASB tentatively concluded that “it would 
not be possible to accommodate concerns about the operation of different legal 
jurisdictions in one standard.”14 Furthermore, it noted that any such accommodation 
would compromise the usefulness of information provided in the financial statements. 
The Board observed that it had proposed retaining the existing prejudicial disclosure 
exemption and concluded that no further exemptions were required.15  
 
The serious-prejudice carve out in IAS 37 is not common to all national general accepted 
accounting principles (GAAPs) and some countries do not allow for such exemption from 
disclosure at all. It is meant to be used rather exceptionally, although its scope of 
application seems to be broader than its actual use by accountants at the moment.16 Here 
                                                            
13  IAS 37, para. 92: “In extremely rare cases, disclosure of some or all of the information required 
[…] can be expected to prejudice seriously the position of the entity in a dispute with other parties 
on the subject matter of the provision, contingent liability or contingent asset. In such cases, an 
entity need not disclose the information, but shall disclose the general nature of the dispute, 
together with the fact that, and reason why, the information has not been disclosed.” 
14  IAS 37 Round-table Discussions: Background materials, 2006, para. 74. Also see IASB Staff 
paper ‘Liabilities – amendments to IAS 37: Summary of decisions reached since the publishing 
exposure draft’ of February 2010, topic 3.3.  
15  See notes 13 and 14, supra. Also see IASB Staff paper “IFRS to replace IAS 37 – Recognising 
liabilities arising from lawsuits’ of 7 April 2010, para. 15. 
16  It should be noted that liabilities are to be reported as aggregate amounts for each class of 
liabilities, so the financial reports themselves would not normally provide for amounts per 
individual case, notwithstanding the possibility that such information could be deducted if classes 
would  be  narowly  defined  or  –  as  we  will  see  in  the  US  example  in  paragraph  4  –  national  
measures would require an itimized breakdown of a certain class of liabilities, like tax liabilities.  
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lawyers may need to work on changing the mindset of accountants and national standard 
setting bodies.  
 
In respect of assessing tax liabilities IAS 12 on Income Taxes has precedence over IAS 
37. Be that as it may, the tendency described in view of IAS 37 is relevant in order to 
understand part of the background in changes to IAS 12, as the current IAS 12 does 
require the disclosure of tax-related contingent liabilities in accordance with IAS 37 
(which includes the serious prejudice exemption).17  
 
In 2009 an Exposure Draft was circulated for a new IFRS on Income Tax,18 replacing the 
current IAS 12.  Most importantly the 2009 draft proposes to account for income taxes by 
recognising current taxes at “an amount that includes the effect of the possible outcomes 
of a review by the tax authorities”.19 It also states that a company “shall measure current 
and deferred tax assets and liabilities using the probability-weighed average amount of all 
the possible outcomes, assuming that the tax authorities will examine the amounts 
reported to them and have full knowledge of all relevant information.”20 Furthermore, 
                                                            
17  IAS 12, para. 88: “An entity discloses any tax-related contingent liabilities and contingent assets 
in accordance with IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. Contingent 
liabilities and contingent assets may arise, for example, from unresolved disputes with the taxation 
authorities. […]” 
18  ‘Income Tax’ as referred to by the IASB essentially covers any direct tax on profit levied from the 
reporting entity, such as a corporate income tax. 
19  IAS Exposure Draft Income Tax ED/2009/2 of March 2009, para 5(a). 
20  Ibid., para. 26. It is yet unclear whether this provision should be limited to tax authorities or 
whether it applies to all government authorities that may have a decisive influence over a 
company’s tax liabilities. Given my research focus on the EU’s state aid rules (Article 107ff 
TFEU), I wonder whether this provision should be interpreted in such manner that any authority 
that could rule on tax liabilities should be considered fully informed. If, for instance, it is to be 
assumed that the European Commission would be fully aware of tax benefits received by a 
particular company by means of an ad-hoc ruling, one could wonder whether upon measuring tax 
liabilities we should take into account the possibility that such benefits needs to be recovered from 
the beneficiary if it amounts to illegal state aid in line with EU rules on government subsidies. As 
this issue is off-topic for the purpose of this paper, it will not be further addressed here. 
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contrary to the current IAS 12 there is no reference to IAS 37 anymore in regard to tax-
related contingent liabilities. Instead the relevant paragraph has been replaced and it now 
prescribes that tax-related uncertainties, such as the financial effects of unresolved 
disputes with the tax authorities, should result in the disclosure of information about the 
uncertainty by describing it and indicating its possible effect on tax amounts recognized 
and the timing of such effects.21 As a result of this divergence from IAS 37, a serious-
prejudice exemption will no longer apply to the disclosure of contingent tax liabilities, 
including those that are the subject of ongoing court proceedings. 
 
The proposed changes to IAS 12 will effectively disallow detection risk to be taken into 
account upon measuring tax liabilities.22 While the risk of actual detection should not 
affect the recognition of benefits in general, under current IAS 12 a negligible risk of 
detection could lead to a very low measurement of (contingent) tax liabilities as reflected 
                                                            
21  Proposed IFRS, para. 49, replacing IAS 12, para. 88. As for legal liabilities in general the IASB 
pointed out that there seems rather little difference in disclosing the expected value of the most 
likely outcome of lawsuits, in particular in circumstances where neither can be measured reliably. 
Moreover, IAS 37’s replacement will “not require entities to disclose the amount they have 
recognized for each individual dispute. It requires entities to disclose only the total amounts 
recognised for each class of liability.” As for the risk of discovery of opinions on the expected 
value of cash outflows arising from litigation in general, the IASB points out that there would be 
little difference in respect to the current IAS requiring estimates of the most likely outcome. 
(Exposure Draft, Measurement of Liabilities in IAS 37, ED/2010/1, para. BC17) 
22  From the IASB’s Basis for Conclusions on the Exposure Draft Income Tax (ED/2009/2, para. 
58/59): “[The] Board concluded that an entity has a liability to pay more tax if the tax authority 
does not accept the amounts submitted. Consistently with the approach taken in the proposed 
amendments to IAS 37, no probability-based recognition threshold is applied. Rather, the 
uncertainty is included in the measurement of the tax assets and liabilities. That is done by 
measuring current and deferred tax assets and liabilities using the probability-weighted average of 
all possible outcome. FIN 48 [released by the US’ Financial Accounting Standards Board, RL] 
requires an entity to assume that the tax authorities will review the amounts submitted when 
recognising and measuring tax benefits. The alternative would be to require entities to include 
their assessment of whether the tax authorities will review the amount in the recognition and 
measurement of tax assets and liabilities. The Board agreed with the approach in FIN 48.” 
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in the consolidated accounts; it may even lead to the non-recognition of tax liability in its 
entirety. Be this as it may, under current IAS 12 a negligible detection risk could make a 
tax liability untraceable as part of consolidated accounts. Under the new text of IAS 12, 
excluding the detection risk in both recognition and measurement will potentially give 
rise to a number of red flags with the tax authorities, comparable to the introduction of 
FIN 48 in the US in 2007.23  
 
As it was heavily criticized the full replacement of IAS 12 no longer has priority at the 
IASB. Instead it decided to expedite the adoption of a partial – but substantial – revision 
of IAS 12, which is likely to still include the proposed exclusion of detection risk and the 
elimination of the serious-prejudice carve out. A new Exposure Draft is to be expected by 
the end of 2010. 
 
4. US developments: International Revenue Announcement 2010-9 
Disclosing information on contingent tax liabilities under IFRS may provide a trigger for 
a more in-depth investigation by national tax authorities. As the data available through 
IFRS reports will be aggregated data it may be expected that additional national tax 
disclosure rules will be adapted to facilitate the translation of such disclosure to specified 
amounts that are useful for tax investigations. In this respect the US Internal Revenue 
Service (hereinafter: the IRS or the Service) recently circulated a heavily criticized 
proposal for disclosure of information on uncertain tax positions in addition to the 
information contained in financial statements: 
                                                            
23  With the notable exception of FIN 48 still containing a more-likely-than-not threshold for 
recognition of liabilities instead of using an expected value approach. In this article FIN 48 will be 
used to indicate the US disclosure rules, as they are best known to the general tax audience under 
this reference number. The relevant parts of FIN 48 have since been codified in 2009 as part of the 
Federal Accounting Standards Board Accounting Standards Codification, topic 740-10. 
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“Taxpayers not subject to FIN 48 may be subject to other requirements regarding 
accounting for uncertain tax positions. For example, taxpayers may be subject to other 
generally accepted accounting standards, including International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) […]. The information developed in the course of complying with FIN 
48 or other accounting standards is highly relevant to understanding the taxpayer’s tax 
positions and assessing how those positions affect the taxpayer’s tax liability. The 
Service is developing a schedule that will require certain filers to provide information 
about their uncertain tax positions that affect their United States federal income tax 
liability. […] The schedule will require (i) a concise description of each uncertain tax 
position for which the taxpayer or a related entity has recorded a reserve in its financial 
statements and (ii) the maximum amount of potential federal tax liability attributable to 
each uncertain tax position (determined without regard to the taxpayer’s risk analysis 
regarding its likelihood of prevailing on the merits). In addition to those positions for 
which a tax reserve must be established under FIN 48 or other accounting 
standards, uncertain tax positions will include any position related to the 
determination of any United States federal income tax liability for which a taxpayer 
or a related entity has not recorded a tax reserve because (i) the taxpayer expects to 
litigate the position, or (ii) the taxpayer has determined that the Service has a 
general administrative practice not to examine the position. […] [T]he schedule will 
require a taxpayer to specify for each uncertain tax position the entire amount of 
United States federal income tax that would be due if the position were disallowed in 
its entirety on audit. This amount is the maximum tax adjustment for the position 
reflecting all changes to items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit if the position is 
not sustained.”24 
 
 
                                                            
24  Internal Revenue Bulletin 2010-7 of 16 February 2010, pp. 408-410, Announcement 4010-9, at p. 
410 (emphasis added). This will only apply to companies that have a minimum of 10 million US$ 
in assets. Also see the rather critical commentaries from the American Bar Association’s Section 
of Taxation (Letter of May 28 to IRS Commissioner Shulman, 2010 Comments on 
Announcements 2010-9, 2010-17 and 2010-30) and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (Letter of June 1, 2010 to IRS Commissioner Shulman, Comments on 
Announcements 2010-9, 2010-17 and 2010-30 with Regard to Uncertain Tax Positions.) 
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Even if the changes proposed to IAS 12 with regard to excluding detection risk would be 
delayed, it is specifically stated that the itemized disclosure of uncertain tax positions 
under other (non-US) accounting standards must include those positions that would not 
normally be examined by the IRS. So, even if the IAS/IFRS would continue to allow 
taking the chance of actual examination and detection into consideration the IRS would 
require additional disclosure. In this respect the American Bar Association put it mildly 
when it argued that the disclosure of any potential tax adjustment “would reflect, at least 
to some degree, the taxpayer’s thought process regarding the merits of a particular 
issue”.25 It should also be pointed out that under Announcement 2010-9 there would be a 
disclosure of the amount of tax due assuming that a tax position would be disallowed in 
full, while under the proposed IFRS there would still be a disclosure of the weighed 
possible outcomes.  
 
In response to the many comments received with respect to these announcements the IRS 
already indicated in October 2010 that its final rule will be adapted. One of these 
adaptations will be the elimination of the requirement ‘to include the rationale and nature 
of the uncertainty in concise descriptions’.26 Also, it will no longer be necessary to report 
the maximum tax adjustment per tax position, but companies will be obliged to rank their 
tax positions in a way that their relative materiality can still be easily assessed. 
Companies will also not be required to report a tax position that they ‘would litigate, if 
challenged, but that is clear and unambiguous or is immaterial’.27 One may wonder what 
‘clear and unambiguous’ tax positions the IRS would actually challenge, but this 
clarification confirms the need to disclose most other tax positions that companies expect 
to litigate in court if challenged. From a comparative perspective, I cannot but wonder 
whether in a European setting such disclosure would be considered to be in line with 
Article 6 ECHR once major tax penalties could be involved.  
 
                                                            
25  ABA Section of Taxation, ibid. at pp. 3 and 15. 
26  IRS Bulletin 2010-41 of 12 October 2010, Announcement 2010-75, pp. 428-432 at p. 429. 
27  Ibid., at p. 431. 
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5. Producing physical evidence: the Allen decision and the Saunders judgement 
For the application of Article 6 ECHR it should be pointed out that we are focusing on 
the disclosure of tax offenses that may be subject to substantial financial punishment 
(including substantial administrative penalties) or might even lead to imprisonment, i.e. 
offenses of a criminal nature. Hence it is not the regular tax procedure that is at issue here 
– as it is basically excluded from the scope of Article 6 ECHR28 –   but  the  (part  of)  
procedure dealing with the penalty. In respect of the strained relationship between 
providing documentation and the right to remain silent, a number of ECtHR judgments 
and decisions are of particular interest. From the Saunders judgment it follows that  
 “the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised 
international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under 
Article 6 […]. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the 
prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without 
resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of 
the will of the accused.  In this sense the right is closely linked to the presumption of 
innocence contained in Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention […]. The right not to 
incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with respecting the will of an 
accused person to remain silent. As commonly understood in the legal systems of the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention and elsewhere, it does not extend to the use in 
criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused 
through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of 
the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a 
warrant […].”29 
 
From J.B. it follows that:  
                                                            
28  See, for instance, ECtHR 12 July 2001, 44759/98, Ferrazzini, para. 29-30 (in respect of tax 
payments and corresponding interest payments fall outside the scope of civil rights and 
obligations) and ECtHR 24 February 1994, 12547/86, Bendenoun, para. 57, as well  as ECtHR 9 
October 2003, 39665/98 and 40086/98, Ezeh and Connors, para. 82-130, where Article 6(1) 
ECHR was deemed applicable once the presence of a criminal charge was established. 
29  ECtHR 17 December 1996, 19187/91, Saunders, para. 68-69 (emphasis added). 
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“it was in particular important for the authorities to know whether or not the applicant 
had obtained any income which had not been taxed. While it is not for the Court to 
speculate as to what the nature of such information would have been, the applicant 
could not exclude that, if it transpired from these documents [documents concerning 
companies in which J.B. had invested money, RL] that he had received additional 
income which had not been taxed, he might be charged with the offence of tax 
evasion. […]  The Government have further submitted that the applicant had not been 
obliged to incriminate himself, since the authorities were in fact already aware of the 
information in question and he had admitted the amounts concerned. The Court remains 
unconvinced by this argument in view of the persistence with which the domestic tax 
authorities attempted to achieve their aim. Thus, between 1987 and 1990 the authorities 
found it necessary to request the applicant on eight separate occasions to submit the 
information concerned and, when he refused to do so, they successively imposed 
altogether four disciplinary fines on him. […].”30 
Here J.B. either had to provide possibly incriminating information or face a fine if failing 
to do so. The authorities actively threatened J.B. with this fine and eventually imposed it. 
Furthermore, in Funke the ECtHR notes that  
“customs secured Mr Funke’s conviction [for refusing to disclose documents, RL] in 
order to obtain certain documents which they believed must exist, although they were not 
certain of the fact. Being unable or unwilling to procure them by some other means, they 
attempted to compel the applicant himself to provide the evidence of offences he had 
allegedly committed. The special features of customs law […] cannot justify such an 
infringement of the right of anyone "charged with a criminal offence", within the 
autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6 […], to remain silent and not to 
contribute to incriminating himself.”31 
In light of Funke the need to disclose information under accounting ‘law’ (or 
government-sanctioned standards for that matter) should neither justify infringing the 
right to remain silent as later clarified by Saunders and J.B.. But Funke also points out 
                                                            
30  ECtHR 3 May 2001, 31827/96, J.B., para. 66 and 69 (emphasis added). 
31  ECtHR 25 February 1993, 10828/84, Funke, para. 44 (emphasis added) 
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the need for a criminal charge to be present or imminent before Article 6 ECHR may 
apply, which is our main hurdle. 
All these cases preceded the Allen decision which is of major importance here: 
“The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a 
criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence 
obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the 
accused. In this sense the right in question is closely linked to the presumption of 
innocence contained in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention […]. The right not to 
incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with respecting the will of an 
accused person to remain silent in the context of criminal proceedings and the use made 
of compulsorily obtained information in criminal prosecutions. It does not per se 
prohibit the use of compulsory powers to require persons to provide information 
about their financial or company affairs […]. In the present case, therefore, the Court 
finds that the requirement on the applicant to make a declaration of his assets to the 
Inland Revenue does not disclose any issue under Article 6 § 1, even though a penalty 
was attached to a failure to do so. The obligation to make disclosure of income and 
capital for the purposes of the calculation and assessment of tax is indeed a common 
feature of the taxation systems of Contracting States and it would be difficult to 
envisage them functioning effectively without it. The Court notes that in this case the 
applicant does not complain that the information about his assets which he gave the 
Inland Revenue was used against him in the sense that it incriminated him in the 
commission of an offence due to acts or omissions in which he had been involved prior to 
that moment. His situation may therefore be distinguished from that of the applicant in 
Saunders […]. Nor was he prosecuted for failing to provide information which might 
incriminate him in pending or anticipated criminal proceedings, as in the cases of Funke, 
Heaney and McGuinness and J.B. […]. The applicant was charged with and convicted of 
the offence of making a false declaration of his assets to the Inland Revenue. In other 
words, he lied, or perjured himself through giving inaccurate information about his 
assets. This was not an example of forced self-incrimination about an offence which 
he had previously committed; it was the offence itself. It may be that the applicant lied 
in order to prevent the Inland Revenue uncovering conduct which might possibly be 
criminal and lead to a prosecution. However, the privilege against self-incrimination 
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cannot be interpreted as giving a general immunity to actions motivated by the 
desire to evade investigation by the revenue authorities. Furthermore, not every 
measure taken with a view to encouraging individuals to give the authorities information 
which may be of potential use in later criminal proceedings must be regarded as improper 
compulsion […]. The applicant faced the risk of imposition of a penalty of a 
maximum of GBP 300 if he persisted in refusing to make a declaration of assets, 
which may be contrasted with the position in the Saunders case, where a two year 
prison sentence was the maximum penalty […] Consequently, the Court does not find 
that the facts of this case disclose any infringement of the right to silence or privilege 
against self-incrimination or that there has been any unfairness contrary to Article 6 § 1 
of the Convention.”32 
While the Allen decision seems to provide a solid case in favor of gathering information 
for tax purposes (even under threat of a fine in case of non-compliance),33 three particular 
issues deserve attention. First of all, contrary to the facts of the Allen case and in line with 
Funke and J.B. the disclosure of accounting information could reveal a tax offence 
previously committed. Secondly, unlike Mr Allen who was facing a £ 300 penalty a 
person providing incorrect or incomplete accounting information may, at least in some 
EU Member States, be facing a far more substantial penalty or even imprisonment for 
accounting violations.34 Thirdly, Mr Allen actively provided incorrect information unlike 
                                                            
32  ECtHR 10 September 2002, Decision 76574/01, Allen, dictum, 1(emphasis added). 
33  In relation to Allen also see ECtHR 8 April 2004, 38544/97 Weh, para. 45: “The Court noted that 
there were no pending or anticipated criminal proceedings against the applicant and the fact that 
he may have lied in order to prevent the revenue authorities from uncovering conduct which might 
possibly lead to a prosecution did not suffice to bring the privilege against self-incrimination into 
play” and ECtHR 8 April 2003, 13881/02, King, dictum: “The privilege against self-incrimination 
cannot be interpreted as giving a general immunity to actions motivated by the desire to evade 
investigation by the revenue authorities”. 
34  As emphasized by the ECtHR, the severity of the penalty may play a role here. To the contrary: R. 
Clayton/H. Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, at 
p. 264. Based on the Allen decision they conclude that “it would seem that even an accurate return 
of income or capital that is (required for tax purposes on pain of criminal sanction) that [sic] 
reveals prior tax evasion would not be a breach of freedom from self-incrimination.” It should be 
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Mr Funke who refused to give information. While the right to remain silent in order to 
prevent self-incrimination does fall within the scope of Article 6 ECHR, it would go too 
far as to interpret that article to allow a person to provide false information in order not to 
incriminate oneself.35 That being said, how should we qualify the non-disclosure of 
certain tax liabilities? As a passive exercise of the right not to incriminate oneself or as a 
separate criminal act of providing incorrect or incomplete, misleading financial 
statements? 
Obviously when it comes to depriving the right not to be coerced into incriminating 
oneself from its very essence, mere administrative obligations like drafting accounting 
statements can hardly be put on a par with severe physical or psychological mistreatment 
by government authorities. So the underlying issue here is whether the prospect of facing 
an accounting penalty for lack of full disclosure of contingent tax liabilities already 
classifies as improper compulsion. Prima facie it seems not to be; the mere existence of a 
severe sanction for certain behavior – even in combination with statements by 
government officials concerning their intensified ‘pursuit’ of fraudulent accounting in 
general –  is unlikely to meet the standard of improper compulsion as long as there has 
not been an act by either the tax authorities or by a (government-endorsed) accounting 
supervisor that may lead a company to conclude that a criminal charge is imminent.36 Be 
that as it may, if a company where to disclose a multi-million Euro tax liability of which 
the tax authorities are not aware before publication of the accounting reports, it is just a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
pointed out that the latter cannot be derived from the Allen decision as in that case mr Allen did 
not complain about the (potential) disclosure of previous offences. 
35  Berger puts this in the context of committing perjury, although the Allen case did not concern 
statements made in court. See M. Berger, Europeanizing Self-Incrimination: The Right to Remain 
Silent in the European Court of Human Rights, Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 12., 
2006, pp. 339-381, at p. 365. 
36  Also compare European Commission of Human Rights, 26 February 1997, 27943/95, decision on 
admissability, Abas, in respect of the criminal charge relevancy in tax cases. (This European 
Commission of Human Rights was abolished in 1988 and is not to be confused with the ECtHR or 
the EU’s European Commission. The first-mentioned Commission would decide on admissibility 
and examine the merits of the case, before a case could be brought to the ECtHR.) 
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matter of time before proceedings will be initiated in most cases. I cannot but wonder 
whether such imminent disclosure of (potential) previous offences would already suffice 
to conclude that criminal proceedings (including tax proceeding leading up to substantial 
penalties) can be anticipated.37 In my view, the answer is affirmative although this still 
does not make a criminal charge ‘imminent’ as currently required by ECtHR case-law. 
In both Allen and King the ECtHR did allow for an enquiry into a person’s tax liability by 
the tax authorities, because in both cases there was not an enquiry into previous offences 
(nor a preliminary enquiry to subsequent prosecution) and neither was a severe penalty 
imposed for such previous offence.38 One may be convicted for failing to declare all 
assets as required by law, but this would be an offense by itself that would not be related 
to self-incrimination39 (because full disclosure would have led to the absence of a 
punishable offense, assuming that the disclosure of those assets would not reveal any 
criminal activity, illegal sources of income or alike).  
Compare this to the following situation. The tax law of a state requires a company to do 
bookkeeping in accordance with certain standards. If the company would have two sets of 
books – one set submitted to the tax authorities and the other (more reliable) set for 
internal purposes –  seizing the latter set of pre-existing material evidence would not 
normally fall foul of the principle of self-incrimination in light of the Saunders judgment. 
On the other hand, if the company only has one set of books and the company’s manager 
has a second set of books in his mind (by means of an ingenious recalculation key), 
ordering the latter to write down the actual numbers under threat of a substantial penalty 
may fall foul as this would produce evidence that is not pre-existing and fully dependent 
on the will of the accused to disclose. 
                                                            
37  The ECtHR recalled that “there is no requirement that allegedly incriminating evidence obtained 
by coercion actually be used in criminal proceedings before the right not to incriminate oneself 
applies”.  (ECtHR 6563/03 of 4 October 2005, Shannon, para. 34.) 
38  See notes 32 and 33, supra. 
39  Also see A. Ashworth, Self-Incrimination in European Human Rights Law – A Pregnant 
Pragmatism?, Cardozo Law Review, 2008, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 751-774, at p. 758 and p. 772. 
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6. Conflict of interest: reliable accounting versus effective legal protection 
By disregarding the detection risk of tax anomalies and by cancelling out the serious-
prejudice  exemption  under  an  IAS  12  replacement,  a  legal  entity  (or  better:  its  
management) may be required to disclose information about previous tax offences or to 
provide information that might harm their position in ongoing tax litigation. Even under 
the current IAS 12 contingent tax liabilities may have to be disclosed in cases where such 
disclosure would not seriously prejudice ongoing tax litigation, but there still is this 
carve-out available when it would. 
It are the two explicit exceptions contained in the Allen decision that allow for tension to 
arise between standard-setting for accounting purposes, tax law and the fair trial 
requirements of Article 6 ECHR, in particular after the increase in accounting sanctions 
in Europe as a result of the fall-out of the Enron scandal in the US and the global banking 
crisis.  
If companies provide the information required under the draft text of the IFRS replacing 
IAS 12 the tax authorities would be able to avail themselves of declaratory statements 
providing cumulative liabilities based on the estimates of tax litigation outcomes. 
National law may allow tax authorities to demand an itemized breakdown of disclosed, 
accumulated tax liabilities. This could – for instance – result in revealing an estimated 
70% chance of having to pay up which might be taken into consideration by the courts 
when it comes to assessing whether a taxpayer acted bona fide or whether he willingly 
tried his luck in an attempt to defraud the tax authorities. In the end, it would obviously 
still be a matter of national law how to deal with taxpayers taking a tax position with a 
30% chance of success and whether this would meet the standards of a criminal act. 
Such national legal qualification will obviously be of little concern to the IASB. We 
cannot expect the IASB to take regional/national legal safeguards into account as long as 
they are not universally recognized as its IAS/IFRS should be rather universally 
applicable. Even so, it is hard to see why it would maintain a serious-prejudice exemption 
for all litigation but tax litigation from a mere (non-tax) legal and accounting perspective. 
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Be that as it may, the national accounting standard boards of EU Member States as well 
as the European Commission in its endorsement role should take due account of regional 
safeguards and adapt IASB standards accordingly when necessary. The intention not to 
add things to those standards (such as carve outs) must remain only a secondary objective 
in this respect. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The IASB’s draft financial reporting standards dealing with the disclosure of tax 
liabilities have triggered little discussion within the EU’s legal profession up to now. This 
is rather remarkable compared to the major discussions that preceded FIN 48 and the 
disclosure of uncertain tax positions within the United States.  
From an EU perspective, the IAS/IFRS endorsement process brings in governmental 
involvement next to a private standard-setting body. Prior to any endorsement the 
European Commission is bound to check whether any standard violates primary EU Law. 
Since the legal safeguards included in the Charter as well as in the ECHR have been put 
on  a  par  with  primary  EU  Law  and  basic  principles  of  EU  law  respectively,  the  
Commission must take those rights into consideration. 
It is clear from the Saunders judgement that a tax payer may not be forced to produce 
evidence against himself that does not pre-exist independent of his will. The Allen 
decision does indicate that producing tax records is an acceptable requirement. However, 
it follows from that same decision that producing evidence on previous tax offences 
already committed under threat of severe penalty may still infringe upon a taxpayer’s 
right not to incriminate oneself. This exception included in the Allen decision deserve due 
attention. 
The proposed changes to IAS 12 will result in producing financial statements upon the 
presumption that tax authorities have been fully and correctly informed and will 
investigate tax positions, thus disregarding any detection risk. As a result adherence to 
this formula should normally reveal all (contingent) tax liabilities, even those that have 
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not been declared to the tax authorities. While this is how the accounting system should 
function (and how government would want it to), we must consider that this formula is 
also a recipe for disclosing previous tax offences under threat of a severe (accounting) 
penalty. Disclosures of one’s own estimates of success in tax litigation may also be 
detrimental to bona fide legal positions in case of upcoming or pending court cases. 
When it comes down to disclosing tax liabilities for accounting purposes for optimal 
reliability of financial statements, little weight seems to be given to the legal dimension 
in setting financial reporting standards. While it may be argued that a criminal charge is 
not to be considered ‘imminent’ when accounting standards require disclosure of 
contingent tax liabilities revealing previous tax offences, a violation of Article 6 ECHR 
may be more obvious in cases where a penalty has already been imposed and court 
proceedings are pending.  
Be that as it may, the mere existence of a statutory accounting sanction like a substantial 
penalty or even imprisonment – meant to punish accounting violations and to deter 
(re)offending – does not suffice to conclude that there is any improper compulsion 
infringing upon the taxpayer’s right not to incriminate himself as it is passive. I consider 
this to be a shortcoming in current ECtHR case-law. Once companies are actively 
threatened with the imposition of sanctions by government(-endorsed) accounting 
supervisors or by the tax authorities, Article 6 ECHR may come into play. At least for 
these situations I recommend the European Commission to include/maintain a serious-
prejudice carve out to the disclosure of contingent tax liabilities before endorsing any 
new IFRS replacing IAS 12 for application within the EU.  
 
 
